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EDITORIAL NOTES
REVOCATION OF BUILDING PERMITS

The zoning case of Cahn v. Guion,' involves two questions, one
of constitutional law and one of practice.
The plaintiff, Cahn, proposed to erect a number of apartment
houses in a high-class residence district which at that time was
free from apartment houses and in which the deed building restrictions were about to expire. He obtained building permits
and was engaged in the making of arrangements and expenditures
preparatory to the construction of the apartment buildings.
Thereupon the city of Cleveland passed a stop-gap zoning ordinance, under which this particular section of the city fell within a
single-family residence district.
The ordinance was not the
product of that type of careful survey and planning which forms
one of the bases of the constitutionality of zoning and was frankly
a stop-gap ordinance, based largely on the then existing developments in the various districts. The building commissioner proceeded toward the revocation of the building permits which he
had issued. Both the issuance of the building permits and the
proposed revocation antedated the taking effect of the stop-gap
ordinance and, in fact, that ordinance had not gone into effect
at the time of the litigation.
Cahn brought an action for a mandatory injunction, which
could be expressed as an action to enjoin the revocation or as an
action to compel the withdrawal of the revocation.
'27 Ohio App. 141 (1928).

448

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW

The court decided against the plaintiff. The constitutionality
of zoning was assumed and there was no discussion as to any
fundamental differentiation between a stop-gap and a final zoning ordinance. The main constitutional question discussed was
whether a building permit creates a vested interest which cannot
be taken away; in other words, whether it is constitutional, in
effect, to legislate away a building permit after the same has been
issued. The court held that no such vested interest was created,
and this holding is unquestionably correct and in line with the
weight of authority.
Indeed, there is considerable confusion in text books and decisions in the use of the expression "vested interest", the same
being sometimes used as though the owner of a vested interest
becomes completely immune from legislation. There is not and
cannot be, in constitutional law, such a thing as a right to be
free from the exercise of the police power. The power to legislate
in the interest of public health, morals, convenience, order and
welfare exists over all persons and property.2 Every title to
property is a vested interest, but subject to the police and other
legislative powers nevertheless. To find that a building permit
is a vested interest does not free it from the exercise of the police
power; and zoning is admittedly an exercise of the police power.
Even if a building permit were held to create a contract between
the city and the recipient of the permit, that would not necessarily answer the question of the validity of an ordinance which
in effect nullified the permit. For contracts, like other property
rights, are subject to the police power.' But a building permit
is not a contract. The leading case of Brett v. Brookline 4 held
that zoning legislation may revoke permits even though building
contracts had been made in reliance on the permit. The cases
which limit the right of the municipality, in a zoning ordinance,
to nullify building permits issued previous to the enactment of the
ordinance, cannot be explained by any exact definition of vested
interest or police power nor by any close reasoning from accepted
principles of constitutional law.
Theoretically, as a building permit does not create a vested
interest nor property right, no amount of expenditure in reliance
2Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53 (1851).
sThorpe v. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140 (1855).
'250 Mass. 73, 145 N. E. 269 (1924).
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on a building permit can create such a vested interest or property
right as to effect a limitation upon the exercise of the police power.
Practically, however, the actual decision in a litigated case will
generally turn on questions of degree; and if substantial amounts
of money and service have been expended after and in reliance
upon the permit and while no litigation on the subject is pending
or impending, and there has not been anything inequitable or
unconscionable in the conduct of the permit holder, the court will
be likely to find some way of producing an equitable result, whatever its view as to the technical nature of a building permit. The
recent case of Rice v. Van Vranken,' holds that substantial construction on the land, not the permit, creates the vested interest.
The constitution will be interpreted so as to enable the court to
protect the permit-holder from too "raw a deal".
In the case under examination, the plaintiff brought an action
which he called mandatory injunction and which the court felt
justified in treating as an action in equity and one, consequently,
which subjected the plaintiff to equity maxims and equitable
considerations; and as the court felt that the plaintiff was seeking
to exploit for his own profit a temporary situation in which a
high-grade residential district was deprived of its protective
restrictions, the court found in the facts a chancellor's justification
for refusing equitable relief. If the plaintiff had permitted his
building permits to be revoked and then applied for new permits
before taking effect of the ordinance and then brought a mandamns action pure and simple, the decisive grounds of this decision would not have been available to the court, and the constitutionality of the stop-gap measure would have become the
main and the unescapable issue.
The case presents nothing that is novel and represents simply
one judge's way of helping to preserve a residential district until
the legal arrangements for that preservation could be perfected.
ALFRED

1229 N. Y. Supp. 32 (1928).
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THE SCINTILLA

RULE

The second paragraph of the syllabus and the opinion in the
recent case of Jacob Laub Baking Company v. Middleton' support
the contention advanced by Mr. Walter T. Kinder that the supreme court has abolished the scintilla rule.' Syllabus 2 follows:
"When the proof of the essential facts put in issue and the
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom are such that the jury,
as fair-minded men, should reasonably arrive at but one conclusion, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of
the party which such proof sustains."
The same language appears in the opinion' and immediately
after it the following:
"If, on the other hand, the proof and inferences are such that
fair-minded men could reasonably arrive at different conclusions
therefrom, the facts in issue are triable to the jury."
The language quoted is not necessarily inconsistent with the
scintilla rule as stated in the leading cases.4 It can be reconciled
therewith on the theory that there is not a scintilla of evidence
unless the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Such a
reconciliation, however, would involve a stretching of the concept
of scintilla.' Moreover, practically, the two statements will produce divergent results. The language quoted from Jacob Laub
Baking Company v. Middleton, in which all concurred, will undoubtedly tend to increase the number of directed verdicts and
appears to be, in effect, a repudiation of the scintilla rule.

1118 Ohio

St. 106 (1928).

'Kinder,

The Scintilla Rule-Should it be Abolished? 26 OHIo L. Bux.. AND

Rap. 190 (1928).

'Supra, n. 1., at p. 115.
1"Wherever there is any evidence, however slight, tending to prove the facts
essential to make out a case for the plaintiff, a non-suit cannot be properly
ordered; it is in no case a question as to the weight, but as to the relevancy
of the testimony." Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ohio St.
628, 647 (1855); Gibbs v. Village of Girard, 88 Ohio St. 34, 41, 43, 108 N. E.
299 (1913).

5'A 'scintilla' is defined as 'an iota, a tittle, a glimmer, a trace, a minute
particle, an atom' ." Kinder, op. cit., supra, note 2, at p. 193.
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In view of this most recent expression of the court and of its
position as indicated in the opinions in other recent cases,' it
would seem reasonably clear that the supreme court has turned
its back on the scintilla rule were it not for St. Mary's Gas Co. v.
Brodbeck,' in which Chief Justice Marshall, writing the opinion,
in which all concurred, said that "the well-known scintilla rule
* * * must be applied and respected by courts, regardless of their
belief in the soundness of the rule."
The contrariety thus apparent makes an early and authoritative
disposition of the question more than desirable. The scintilla rule
is considered out-of-date and unsatisfactory by legal scholars,
has been abandoned by most courts, and subjected to attack at.
intervals even by our own courts. 8
The mental processes of a court in deciding whether to direct
a verdict cannot be articulated, nor can a formula be invented
which will provide more than a clue.' In any case, the judge must
rely almost exclusively upon his "trained intuition"' 0 and the
result will be the same in most cases regardless of the formula
made use of.' The vice of the scintilla rule is two-fold: (1) it
excites in the scrupulous judge a paralyzing fear of erring on the
wrong side; (2) it furnishes an excuse for the weak judge to "pass
the buck". In both ways it encourages unmeritorious litigation.
It is to be hoped, therefore, that the supreme court will expressly
abandon it.
A recognition of the limitations of any test or formula that
may be adopted does not mean that no formula is necessary or
desirable.12 Many tests have been proposed." Dean Wigmore
considers the following most satisfactory :14
6Cleveland-Akron Bag Co. v. Jaite, 112 Ohio St. 506, 148 N. E. 82 (1925);
Buell v. New York Central R. R. Co., 114 Ohio St. 40, 150 N. E. 422 (1926);
Detroit, T. & I. R. R. Co. v. Rohrs, 114 Ohio St. 493, 151 N. U. 714 (1926).
7114 Ohio St. 423, 429, 151 N. E. 323 (1926).
8Authorities are collected in the opinion in Cleveland-Akron Bag Co. v.
Jaite, supra, note 6, and in Mr. Kinder's paper, supra, note 2.
'Green, The Negligence Issue, 37 Y. L. J., 1029, .1034 (1928), note 15 Cf.

CARDOZO, THS GROWTH OF THs LAW (1924) Ch. IV.
"Cf.Pound, The Theory of JudicialDecision, 36 H. L.R.940,951,952 (1923).
11C. Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Court Review of Orders oJ the Ohio Public
Utilities Commission, 2 CIN. L. Rsv. 225, 251-253 (1928); Sturges and Clark,

Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages, 37 Y. L.J. 691, 704 et seq. (1928).
"2Green, op. cit., supra, note 9, at p. 1031.
"15 Wigmore, EVIDUNC9 (2nd ed. '1923) 458, n. 13.
145Ibid., note 13, at p. 459.
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"(The proposition) cannot merely be, Is there evidence? * * *
The proposition seems to me to be this: Are there facts in evidence
which if unanswered would justify men of ordinary reason and
fairness in affirming the question."
But this rather evades than meets the issue. The standard of
third party judgment ignores the fact that a man has only his
own mental equipment to think with. He cannot call upon the
intelligence of some hypothetical mentality. If he is able to say
that an intelligent man could reasonably think this or that it is
because he himself considers it reasonable. His judgment is his
own. " The language quoted from Jacob Laub Baking Company v.
Middleton is open to this criticism.
Mr. Kinder takes it for granted that the abandonment of the
scintilla rule means ipso facto the adoption of the federal rule.1 6
This rule 7 has been criticised by Dean Wigmore, 18 and it would
seem justly so. Whatever its merits or demerits, its adoption in
this state would amount to a judicial repeal of section 11577 of
the General Code, which provides that a verdict cannot be set
aside more than once on the weight of the evidence. 9 If the test
be the same on a motion for a directed verdict as on a motion for
a new trial, then a court, having set aside a verdict, if not bound
to enter judgment for the defendant forthwith, would at least be
15Cf. Green, op. cit., supra, note 9, at pp. 1043, 1044.

"8Kinder, op. cit., supra, note 2, at p. 204.
17,, * * * many decisions of this court establish that, in every case, it is the
duty of the judge to direct a verdict in favor of one of the parties when the
testimony and all the inferences which the jury could justifiably draw therefrom would be insufficient to support a different finding." Baltimore and Ohio
R. R. v. Groeger, 266 U. S. 520, 524 (1925).
'8"Insome courts it is said that the test for the ruling is the same as it would
be on a motion after verdict to set aside the verdict as being against the overwhelming weight of evidence. Even if this were so, it would not afford any more
concrete and tangible guide. But it seems unsound, on principle, to assert
such an identity, for two reasons-in the first place, because the mass of
evidence in the two situations is very different (for after verdict the defendant's evidence has to be considered with the rest), and in the next place, because the setting aside of a verdict leads merely to a new trial, while the ruling
of insufficiency leads usually to the direction of a verdict for the opponent,
and therefore a total quantity of the proponents evidence which would justify
the former might be more than would justify the latter." 5 Wigmore, op.
cit., supra, note 13, at pp. 458, 459.
t9
Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Trendel, 101 Ohio-St. 316, 128 N. E. 136 (1920);
Roff v. Heil, 113 Ohio St. 113, 148 N. E. 398 (1925).
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compelled, on a retrial, in the absence of additional evidence, to
direct a verdict, thus depriving the plaintiff of the benefit of the
20
statute.
Consideration of any question leads the human mind either to
certainty or to an opinion, or leaves it in doubt.2 In the case of
the last state of mind the jury will get the case no matter what
formula is adopted. If the first prevail there will be an instructed
verdict under any test. The cases in which a test or formula will
have any potency are those in which the judge's mind has gotten
beyond doubt but not reached certainty, which he will seldom,
if ever, attain-that is, those cases in which he has formed an
opinion. Now an opinion may be strong or it may be weak, and
there are unnumbered shades and degrees of both kinds. On one
side opinion merges into certainty, on the other side into doubt.
The event in any case will, in fact, depend upon the strength of
the judge's opinion. But the shades and degrees of opinion have
no names; they cannot be articulated. Hence it is manifestly
impossible to determine even approximately how strong his
opinion must be. Nevertheless, it must be stronger than is required to set aside a verdict; otherwise section 11577 is rendered
meaningless.
The problem, therefore, is to devise a formula which, while
meeting the objections to the scintilla rule, will put the judge on
notice that a greater degree of assurance is required to direct a
verdict than to set one aside. More than this we cannot hope to
accomplish. No formula can do more than serve as a caution. 22
The test indicated by the opinions in two other recent casesa
may be stated as follows: A verdict should be directed if the only
reasonable conclusion as to the facts is adverse to the plaintiff on
any material issue. This is objectionable on the grounds set out in
the preceding paragraph. It does not sufficiently put the judge on
notice that a stronger opinion is required to direct a verdict than
24
to set a verdict aside.
2

Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., supra, note 4, at p. 647.

Cf. Klass v. Klass, 27 Ohio App. 459 (1928).
Cf. NSWMAN, GRAMMAR Op ASSUNT, 5.
'Cf. Green, op. cit., supra, note 9, at p. 1041.
2'1 COPPSY, UPISTSMOLOGY, 32, 33.

uBuell v. New York Central R. R. Co., and Detroit, T. & I. R. R. Co. v.
Rohrs, supra, note 6.
""It is only where a verdict is palpably against the evidence, or the decided
weight of it, that courts are warranted in interfering to set it aside, in order to
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The following is
How then should the test be formulated?
in the opinion
whenever,
'directed
be
should
proposed: A verdict
material issue
on
any
facts
the
as
to
of the court, the conclusion
5
doubt."
reasonable
a
beyond
plaintiff
the
is against
This would indicate, in so far as it seems possible to do so, that
a greater degree of assurance is required than is necessary to set
aside a verdict. Yet it is not a mere re-statement of the scintilla
rule. Holding that the conclusion is against.the plaintiff beyond a
reasonable doubt is not inconsistent with recognizing that there
is "some evidence, however slight". The proposed 'test is not inconsistent with the most recent expressions of the supreme court
and accords with actual judicial practice except in those cases in
which the judge is led, either through scrupulosity or a desire to
avoid responsibility, to surrender to the jury the judicial function.
Finally, it would not lend itself to this abuse, which the scintilla
JosePH O'MEARA, JR.
rule invites.
send the cause to another trial." Webb v. Protection Insurance Co., 6 Ohio
456, 472 (1834). "We cannot disturb a finding of fact made by the jury, unless
the verdict ig clearly and manifestly not sustained by sufficient evidence."
Livingstone & Co. v. Streeter, 114 Ohio St. 144, 147, 150 N. E. 734 (1926).

UIt may be objected that "reasonable doubt" should be defined, but attempts
at definition tend rather to confuse than to enlighten, for every defining term
must itself be defined, so that the matter tends to become one of mere words.
Cf. 5 WIGMORa, op. cil., supra, note 13, at pp. 465-469.

